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I. Introduction
The efficient management of air quality through the use of pollution emissions trading
systems is not a new idea (see Montgomery (1972)).  It is well known, theoretically, that
one can achieve an efficient allocation of abatement among many firms by establishing
an appropriate structure of pollution rights, if trade occurs so that a competitive
equilibrium is achieved.  However, the implementation of such systems is new and it
appears, in many cases, that the efficiency gains promised by the theorists are foregone
because the implemented market design is not up to the challenge.  See, for example,
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), Burtaw (1994), Hahn and Hester (1989), and  Joskow,
Schmalensee and Bailey(1999).  Even under the best of situations, emission trading
markets are very thin. Because most trades are bilateral, with few known alternatives,
price-taking behavior is not incentive compatible.  Because firms need to complete trades
only occasionally,1 price discovery is difficult if not impossible. Traditional markets,
broker-dealer systems, or traditional auctions simply do not provide the information and
incentives needed to guide traders to a competitive equilibrium.  Gains from exchange
often go unrealized.
In the early 90’s a new emission trading program was created by the South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD), the agency charged with pollution control in
the geographical area around Los Angeles.  Environmentalists, polluting firms, and others
supported it as the only apparent solution to a situation of escalating compliance and
abatement costs.  It was believed and hoped that a trading program would produce
significant cost-savings for firms over the existing command-control approach.  The
program is called the REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) and it
allocates permits to facilities and allows trade.  But, rather than having one market for
one universal permit, in order to retain some measure of regulatory control, the
3SCAQMD created 136 different permits.  They created a different permit for each of two
pollutants (nitrogen and sulfur oxides -- NOx and SOx) to better control each, for each of
two land zones (upwind and downwind) to better control the distribution of the
pollutants, for each of 17 separate years from 1994 to 2010 with possible continuation
beyond) to better control the distribution of pollution over time, and for each of two
compliance cycles to better control year end price volatility.2 In total, there are 136
different permits that firms must consider as they attempt to minimize their costs of
compliance.  This means that there are 136 markets for pollution permits in the
RECLAIM program.  The complexity associated with such an interdependent system of
commodities makes trading by traditional methods extremely difficult.  Emission trading
in LA is more like multi-lateral bargaining than competitive markets.  The benefits to be
harvested from the RECLAIM program in reduced compliance costs could easily remain
unrealized.  Participants in the program recognized this almost immediately.3  In
response, they requested a new trading system be developed, one that provided some help
and guidance through the complexities.
We took up the challenge knowing that theory and current practice provided little
guidance for a good market design.  It was natural, therefore, to turn to the experimental
economics methodology of testbedding for help.  Testbedding new systems as a
systematic part of a design process is standard fare in engineering but only recently has it
been applied to economics. (See Banks, et.al. (1989) or Plott(1994)).  Unlike experiments
designed to test specific theories of behavior, testbedding is used when theory supplies
little design advice.  It helps eliminate bad design features with unintended consequences
and it provides a reality check for intuition.
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 In Los Angeles, compliance is monitored only quarterly.
2 The two cycles are January through December and July through June. (See Carlson et al. (1993) for a
discussion of the price volatility problem).
3 They also recognized that traditional trading methods placed them in a very weak strategic position
relative to brokers who were certainly prepared to capture most of the realized gains from trade for
themselves.
4Here, we report on some experiments used to guide our design of the Automated Credit
Exchange (ACE) trading system - our solution to the lack of liquidity.4  The paper is
organized as follows.   In Sections II and III, we briefly describe the RECLAIM program
as well as other programs and markets.  We then describe, in Section IV, the testbed
results for a standard market design; the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA).  That
design was found wanting.  In Section V, we describe the details of our design for ACE
and , in Section VI, we present some of the experimental evidence that gave us
confidence to put ACE into competition with brokers as a process for trading in the
RECLAIM program.  ACE has been operating successfully and quarterly since April
1995 over the Internet.5
II. Brief Description of the RECLAIM Program
On October 15, 1993, RECLAIM was put in place.  It defined a set of market-based
incentive rules that mandated reductions in emissions of nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur
oxide (SOx) by imposing factory mass emissions caps. Under RECLAIM, a manufacturer
is given an annual emissions limit for his entire plant, and yearly reductions to the plant-
wide limit. Specifically, all sources at a particular facility are collectively assigned an
annual emissions cap based on historic rates for a selected three-year period.  The cap
defines the amount of emissions the facility is allowed for the year.  The cap declines
annually (8.3% per year on average for NOx and 6.8% per year on average for SOx) from
1994 to 2003 and then levels off through 2010.  The program applies to the largest
emission sources for these pollutants in the LA Basin.
Facilities are allowed to emit pollutants up to the amount of RECLAIM Trading Credits
(RTCs) they possess. A facility emitting less than its allocation cap is permitted to sell its
excess emissions to other facilities in the form of RTCs.  If a factory finds that it will
emit, or has emitted, more than its cap, it may purchase RTCs from other facilities or
make reductions in emissions by installing control equipment or reducing production.
                                                          
4 As one will see later, ACE is a computer assisted call market based on the principle of combined value
trading.
5 A paper reporting on the actual performance of ACE is being prepared.
5To retain some semblance of regulatory control, an RTC is designated by the year,
compliance cycle, the pollutant (NOx or SOx), and its zone. The first compliance cycle
runs from January 1 to December 31 of each year and the second cycle runs from June 1
to July 31 of each year.  Zones refer to LA Basin geography and prevailing onshore
winds.  The zones restrict transfers so that upwind (coastal) sources cannot use purchased
downwind (inland) RTCs.  Each RTC is only valid for the single year, cycle, and zone for
which it is designated.  Banking is not allowed.
RECLAIM did not establish or specify a mechanism for the trading of RTCs; it only
established a marketable asset or property right.  It left the creation and operation of
markets, broker mechanisms, etc. to the private sector.  But that created an impossible
task for those responsible for finding profitable trades.  Even without markets, a firm’s
environmental engineer has a complex financial problem.  A decision must be made
whether to purchase abatement equipment, whether to buy or sell permits, and which of
the 136 permits to trade.  There are innumerable options and tradeoffs.  And the answer
depends critically on the prices of the permits.
For example, a firm's production plans might require it to emit 1 million pounds of NOx
per year for 5 years using current technology. If the firm has an 800,000 pound cap on
NOx emissions, it will not be able to meet its production goals and stay within its
environmental constraints. To meet these goals the firm may have a number of options
including:
• Purchase pollution abatement equipment for $1million  that will reduce 200,000
pounds of NOx per year.
• Purchase 200,000 RTCs for each of the 5 years, or
• Purchase 100,000 RTCs for each of the 5 years and purchase pollution abatement
equipment for $600,000 that will reduce 100,000 pounds of NOx per year, or
• Buy current year RTCs, delay installation of abatement equipment for 2 years, and
sell future RTCs.
The option that is most cost effective for the firm will depend on the prices of the
component RTCs.  Further, to avoid market risk the firm would like to be able to
6purchase 5 years' of RTCs as one package. If the firm were to purchase the first year
credits and then find that unanticipated movements in the prices of the last year credits
caused the package price to exceed the cost of the investment in equipment, the firm
could easily find that it had not acted in its most cost-effective way.  It could also then be
held up.
In RECLAIM, such a financial calculation is daunting.  There are 136 different RTC’s to
choose from.  In the above example, suppose the engineer is located near the ocean.
Suppose 100,000 pounds of N0x pollution must be covered in the last half of 1998.
Suppose further that she can use either 100,000 of 1998 cycle 1, zone 1 NOx or 100,000
of 1998 cycle 2, zone 1 NOx or some combination of those.  She cannot buy zone 2
permits; that is, permits from inland factories.  But if she wants to add abatement
equipment and sell permits she holds, she can sell them to anyone located either coastal
or inland.  And she must remember that the supply of, say, 2002 permits is much lower
than those for 1999 and that this should lead to expectations of higher prices for permits
for later years.  Finding the least cost solution to the engineer’s problem would be
difficult even if all price information were available and she could go to competitive
markets to buy or sell.
In the RECLAIM world such active, competitive markets simply don't, and probably
never will, exist.  They are too thin..  This leaves the environmental engineer, and the
company CFO, with a very complex bargaining problem.  For example, how would one
engineer decide on the maximum price she would be willing to pay for a pound of 1999,
cycle 2, zone 1 NOx  since that obviously depends on the price she will have to pay for
2002, cycle 1, zone 2 NOx.  Multi-lateral bargaining over 136 dimensions with complex
constraints simply can’t be done efficiently using traditional broker methods.
Thus, in 1993, many of the firms in the program requested the design of a new type of
market that would help them with their problems.  To respond, we looked first,
unsuccessfully, to other emissions markets.  We then tried a well-known, standard call
market design, UPDA.  It too could not handle our problem.  So we created a combined
7value call market.  Throughout this process, we relied heavily on the new methodology of
economic testbedding.  How we did this is described next.
III. Previous Emissions Markets
We first looked to existing market designs as possibilities for RECLAIM.
The predecessor of RECLAIM was the Emission Reduction Credit Market (ERC).  This
program involves limited trading of credits that are generated when facilities shut down,
retrofit or can show real sustained emission reductions from their source.  This was a
broker market with sequential bilateral trading.  However, sequential and bilateral ERC
trades between noncontiguous sources implies that air quality increases in one location
and decreases in the other which can violate standards imposed by State Implementation
Plans.  In order to obtain a true market equilibrium, simultaneous trading of permits by
"all" firms that takes into account local ambient standards is required.   The ERC market
was not designed in this manner.  Significantly large transaction costs in searching for
sellers and in ensuring the feasibility of an ERC trade have resulted in large commission
fees and few trades (see Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991)).
The most successful emission trading market to date has been the EPA's SO2 allowance
market.   [See Burtaw (1994) or Cason (1995).] In Title IV of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, U.S. electric utilities were required to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emissions by approximately ten million tons from 1980 levels.  The Amendments specify
annual caps on total SO2 emissions with each regulated utility receiving an allocation of
SO2 allowances each year.
6 The Amendments also allowed for creation of markets to buy
and sell allowances.  The allowances are bankable so that unused allowances can be
carried forward to future years.  Thus this really is one market and not many. However,
the EPA auction designed for the SO2 allowance trading has some poor incentive
properties for the bidders. Cason and Plott (1996) show that the EPA's allowance auction
                                                          
6 The allocations were partially based on past emission levels and "political considerations."  In addition,
the EPA retained a small fraction of allowances that it sold in special auctions and direct sales.
8causes participants to strategically underreveal willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-sell.
Joskow et al. (1999) have recently questioned the experimental and theoretical results of
Cason (1993) and Cason and Plott (1996).   Their argument is that the private markets, in
SO2 allowances, provide participants in the EPA auction with information about the
marginal value of allowances.  In addition, they suggest that empirical results from the
auction do not support a cost underrevalation by sellers.  Nonetheless, Joskow et al.
(1999) do acknowledge that the SO2 markets are far from the idealized frictionless
transmitters of information given the uncertainty and long-term nature of abatement
investments.
The argument over the performance of the SO2 market is not the focus of this paper.
RECLAIM is.  The RECLAIM program differs significantly from the SO2.  First,
allowances in RECLAIM are designated by areas so that some trading of credits from one
area to another is not allowed.  Second, there is no banking of credits in RECLAIM.
Lastly, RECLAIM credits are also designated by compliance cycles and these cycles
overlap.
So neither existing design was of much relevance for our problems.  We had to create a
new system.
IV. Would a Standard Auction Market Work?
The basic economic features of RECLAIM are: (1) the program has very few participants
(there are 390 NOx-producing facilities and 41 SOx-producing facilities, but only a
handful were committed to market participation.); (2) there is no established trading
history so that price discovery was not going to be a low cost activity;  (3) there is a need
to trade only at quarterly intervals when compliance checks are reported; and (4) buyers
and sellers would prefer to buy or sell entire portfolios of credits to avoid market
transaction risk—the undesired movement of prices as one is trading from one portfolio
position to another.
9These features of the economic environment describe what financial economists would
call a thin market.  Thin markets create problems for standard broker-dealer markets
because the thinness results in larger bid-ask spreads and poorer price discovery
properties (see Campbell et al (1991)).    One known solution to disorderly price
discovery, when markets are thin, is to allow order aggregation through call markets.
This leads to better price discovery and reduced price volatility.  (See McCabe et al.
(1992)).
In a call market, exchanges occur at the same time with feedback so that all markets clear
simultaneously.7 In what follows we will describe two types of call auctions one might
imagine using to trade RTCs.  One design treats each commodity separately and has a
single uniform price for each RTC.  The other design allows for combined value orders
and tries to preserve the uniform price structure when possible but allows for non-linear
pricing if necessary to encourage more gains from trade.
Each of the call markets was implemented as a sequential process.   This allows a
modicum of negotiation on the way to the real call.  Specifically, the markets are not one-
shot.  Over a series of rounds traders can update bids and offers based on previous
iteration results.  This feature has been shown to be important in price discovery (see
McCabe et al. (1992) and Banks et al. (1989)).  In each round, bids and offers must be
improvements.  To provide proper incentives for price discovery, a new bid, in order to
be accepted, must improve on current bids (increase bid price) or offers (reduce offer
price). Rejected bids are discarded after each iteration.  Finally, in each call market
design, prices are calculated from marginal trades.  Thus, infra-marginal bids and offers
have an incentive to reveal.
                                                          
7 Allowing markets to clear simultaneously has been shown to be an important feature in other auctions.
For example, in the US FCC spectrum auctions, the major design feature is that all the licenses within a
band are auctioned simultaneously, so that bidders will be able to know their substitution possibilities (see
Milgrom (1997)).
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Let us look at a standard type of call market, UPDA--the Uniform Price Double Auction
(see Smith (1982), Van Boening (1996) and Davis and Holt (1993)).  In this design each
buyer i submits a set of bids for each commodity j of the form:
<(pij
1,Qij
1), .....,(pij
m,Qij
m)> = Bij (1)
where pij
w denotes the per unit bid price in order w by buyer i for commodity j and Qij
w is
the corresponding maximum quantity demanded .8   Each seller k submits offers of the
form:
<(ckj
1,Skj
1), ....,(ckj
n,Skj
n)> = Okj (2)
where ckj
v denotes the per unit offer price in order v by seller k for commodity j and Skj
v
is the corresponding maximum quantity offered.  Let Pij
w = pij
w·  Qij
w and Cij
v = ckj
v·  Skj
v,
so that once these bids and offers are submitted, the market maker calculates the accepted
bids and offers by solving the following linear program:
Maxa,b   S i S j S r aij
r · Pij
r  -  S k S j S g bkj
g · Ckj
g  (3)
such that
aij
r, bkj
g Î  [0,1]  "     i,k,j,r,g
S i S r aij
r · Qij
r  -  S k S g bkj
g · Skj
g = 0 "     j
This is nothing more than finding the largest surplus such that supply equals demand for
each commodity.  The price paid by the "winners" is uniform for each j and is equal to:
pj = (pj
L + pj
H)/2 (4)
where
                                                          
8 If person i only submits u < m bids, then pij
z , Qij
z = 0 for z > u.
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pj
L = Max {pij
r: aij
r=0 and pij
r > ckj
g for bkj
g >0} (highest rejected bid) if it exists
pj
H otherwise
pj
H = Min {pkj
g: bkj
g=0 and pij
r > ckj
g for aij
r >0} (lowest rejected offer) if it exists
pj
L otherwise
if neither pj
L nor pj
H exists as defined above, we use:
pj
L = Min   {pij
r: aij
r>0}
pj
H = Max {ckj
g: bkj
r >0}
In single commodity markets with concave preferences and convex costs, UPDA has
been found to be comparable in efficiency to the double auction (see Smith et al. (1982),
Liu (1992) and Friedman (1993)). And, since UPDA produces a single uniform price for
each commodity, it lacks the price volatility of the double auction. It would seem to be
the natural way to organize a market for RECLAIM.
But there are features of the RECLAIM environment that could create difficulties for the
performance of UPDA.  We provide three examples where this might be true.  We also
provide supporting experimental evidence from testbedding to establish that indeed
UPDA does not perform well in these situations.
IV.A All or None Trades
In RECLAIM, firms contemplating abatement equipment installation may want to either
do it or not.  It may be non-economic to take half measures.  Thus, desired permit trades
may be “all or none”.  UPDA can fail to make valuable trades when market orders can
have "all or nothing" constraints.  Consider the supply and demand condition depicted in
Figure 1. In this situation, there are three buyers and three sellers.  Buyer B1 has an
12
inflexible demand for 5 units and a willingness to pay $70 per unit, i.e. V1 (x) =350 if x
=5 and V1 (x) = 0 otherwise where V1(x) is the maximum 1 is willing to pay for a total of
x units.  Buyer B2 has demand such that V2 (x) = 40*x for x < 2 and V3 (x) = 35*x for x
< 2.  Seller S1 has a cost of C1(x) = 50*x for x < 3, seller S2 has a cost C2(x) = 160 if x
=2 and C2(x) = ¥  if x > 2 and C3(x) = 90*x for x < 2.  It is easy to see that there is no
uniform price equilibrium.  It is impossible for UPDA to solve this problem unless some
seller or buyer suffers a loss. There is no one-price equilibrium for the situation charted in
Figure 1.  But, there would be positive surplus if some trade were to occur at non-uniform
prices.  If seller 2 were to receive $80 per unit for his two units, seller 1 were to receive
$55 for his three units and buyer 1 were to pay $65 per unit for 5 units, then the budget
would be balanced and surplus attained.9
This example also illustrates the concept of transaction risk.  If Buyer 1 were to attempt
to negotiate bilaterally with Seller 1 and Seller 2, then Buyer 2 would be happy to pay
$55 per unit to S1 and $80 per unit to S2.  B1 would end up paying $5 less per unit then
what he is willing to pay.  In fact B1 is $25 ahead of his willingness to pay.  But, if the
deal with S1 falls through or if S1 refuses to go below $65, then B1 loses money, if B1
has made the deal with S2 already.  In fact, if the deal falls through, the B1 loses $20.  If
B1 pays $65, he loses $5.  So in fact if S1 knows B1 is in this position, S1 can actually
get B1 to pay up to $70 per unit - she can hold B1 up.  Knowing this B1 is going to be
reluctant to deal separately with S1 and S2.
--- Figure 1 here ---
IV. B Returns to Scale
One might argue assuming all or none preferences is unduly harsh even when facilities
face increasing returns to scale in abatement technology.  The values that traders have for
the permits themselves are really induced via their opportunity cost.  That is, participants
have permits that they can use to either satisfy their own pollution demands or to sell
                                                          
9 All or none preferences are derivable from "avoidable cost" scenarios - a concept found in Van Boening
and Wilcox (1996).
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them to others.  If there are returns to scale in abatement technology, the derived values
for permits might be simply superadditive.  That is, for buyers, it might be that
d2V(x)/dx2 >  0.
Consider for example the three markets (these are labeled A, B and C) depicted in Figure
2.  Each is designed to capture the essential features of a reality that might cause a
problem for UPDA.  There are eight participants in these markets.  In Markets A and C,
each step in the graph represents a participant’s marginal return function for the first three
units. The marginal return for more than 3 units is zero.  In Market A, there is no depth in
the market since there are no extra marginal traders and there is a wide competitive price
tunnel ($13 - $25).  In Market C, there is one seller with no opportunity cost for 10
credits.10   Notice that in this market there is no uniform price equilibrium. As soon as the
price goes above $35 the marginal traders require 3 units or they will make negative
profits.  However, this will cause an excess demand and thus price must rise.  At this
point, either the outcome must result in losses or at least one bidder must forgo the
pursuit of potentially profitable opportunities.   In Market B, there are 10 units for sale.
Each of the 4 demanders has superadditive values for up to 10 units.  Thus, the most
efficient outcome has one demander obtaining all the units from the sellers.  There is a
uniform price competitive equilibrium in this market at a price of $22 (this is the average
profit of the first rejected demander for 10 units).   Values for participants in these
markets can be found in Appendix A.
--- Figure 2 here ---
IV C. Strong Complementarities
In a multiple commodity situation, a subtler problem can arise.  There may be conditions
in which there are strong complements between the pollutants or between RTCs.  The
first occurs if a facility produces both NOx and SOx when it has production runs.  The
                                                          
10 In Market C the only seller was the experimenter, who offered all 10 units at a zero price.
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second arises if a firm would need permits for 10 pounds in each of multiple years in
order to substitute for abatement equipment.  Thus, if the facility demands pollution
credits, it may require them in complementary proportions.  This would not necessarily
create a situation in which competitive equilibrium does not exist, as in Figure 1, but it is
known that strong complementarities cause problems for price discovery through the
creation of bad income effects.
To establish this intuition we create an example in which bidders in Markets A and B
must obtain fixed combinations of units of both A and B in order to obtain value. That is,
Vi(xA, xB) = 0 if {xA, xB} Ë  Xi where Xi is a finite set of combinations that person i
values.  The values we use for Vi  and Xi  can be found in Appendix A.
IV.D. Experiments
To determine if an iterative UPDA could provide for efficient outcomes in the difficult
environments presented in IV.A. to IV.C., we conducted a series of experiments. Subjects
were recruited from the undergraduate student population at the California Institute of
Technology. All the subjects had experience in other market experiments.   Each
experimental session consisted of a single market instance. Each session ran on a
computer network and lasted approximately 1.5 hours.  For the returns to scale
environment, each experimental session consisted of 3 commodities that were traded
simultaneously.  Subjects were assigned randomly to a set of redemption values, costs
and endowments.  Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the sessions.
Communication among subjects was not allowed during the experiment.  While each
subject knew her own valuations, costs, and endowments, she knew nothing about the
valuations, costs, and endowments of the other subjects. Each subject knew the number
of subjects in the experiment.
                                                          
11In our design, there exists a competitive price equilibrium.
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Each experimental session consisted of a single market period consisting of a sequence of
iterations. Each subject had approximately 10 minutes to enter orders and was limited to
a fixed number of orders in each iteration. At the beginning of each iteration, the current
market price and the number of units tentatively accepted for trading in each market were
displayed on subject computer terminals.
Because there is no way for UPDA to create an allocation in market C without someone
making a loss, we thought it unlikely any trade would occur in that market using UPDA.
So rather than doing an experiment based solely on Figure 1, and then having a group of
frustrated subjects on our hands, we used the  all or nothing environment as a third
market (Market C) beside the strong complements treatment.  Two sessions were run.  As
expected, no trade occurred in either even though there were unexploited gains from
trade.
Two sessions were conducted with the returns to scale environments.  The volumes,
prices and efficiencies for each market are provided in Figure 3.   For each Market , the
price, volume and efficiency for each iteration of the auction is provided in the Figures.
Each session lasted 7 iterations before the markets closed.  For Market A each session
produced allocations that were at the 80% level of efficiency when the auction closed at
iteration 7.  Volume was significantly below the prediction of 15 units.  Thus, UPDA did
not do a good job of trading the marginal units.  The same result occurs in Market B but
volume of trade was slightly better.  However in Market C efficiency was almost 100%.
Even though this Market had no competitive equilibrium, participants managed to keep
prices below the danger level of $35.12
---Figure 3 here ---
Two sessions were conducted with the strong complements environment.  The results are
shown in Figure 4.  In session 1, the auction lasted 8 iterations before it closed.  The
                                                          
13 Recall that a main difference in Market C relative to Markets A and B is that there are no sellers in
Market C.  The Experimenter offered all ten units at a zero price.
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prices, volumes and efficiencies for the complementary markets for each iteration are
provided.  Session 1 produced a mere 53% efficiency.  Session 2  lasted only 3 iterations
before the auction closed with a closing efficiency of 66%.  There is a significant
difference in prices between the sessions.
---Figure 4  here ---
IV. Conclusion
The performance of UPDA in the five difficult situations can be easily summarized by
the average efficiency measures.
Efficiency
All or None 0%
Returns to Scale A 80%
Returns to Scale B 80%
Returns to Scale C 100%
Complements 60%
It is clear that a standard call market design like UPDA cannot generate fully efficient
allocations in all situations, especially in those that are created by non-convexities.  Many
of these problematic situations could easily be expected to occur for traders in the
RECLAIM program.  We needed to explore other designs.
V. The Combined Value Call Market (CVCM)
Because we expected the actual emission traders' preferences to be characterized by
increasing returns, strong complementarities, and all or none constraints, we knew a
simple UPDA call market was not going to be able to provide the desired performance.
We needed a call market that would allow traders to bid in a way that would help solve
their business  financial problems.  Our successful experience with combined value
17
auctions (see Banks et.al. (1989)) naturally led us to consider a combined value market.13
We did this by (a) allowing bidders to submit contingent bids describing their
preferences, (b) matching orders in the call by maximizing the “gains from trade”
revealed by the bidders, (c) pricing the trades in a way that leaves bidders at least as well
off as if they didn’t trade and in a way that provides incentives to them to reveal their true
willingness to trade, and (4) ensuring the auctioneer would neither extract excess surplus
nor “trade ahead” of the matching process.14
In the rest of this section we describe our original design for the ACE combined value
call market15.  The general structure of our CVCM paralleled the iterative UPDA.  In
particular, at each iteration agents submit buy/sell orders; a tentative allocation is made
that maximizes gains from trade (the sum of seller and buyer surplus), and tentative
prices are computed for trades.  Winning orders are automatically entered into the next
iteration and can be replaced only if the revision would improve the gains from trade.
Bidders can modify rejected bids in any manner and rebid if they win.  If both surplus
and volume do not increase by at least 5 percent after any iteration the market ends and
transactions are made based on the allocation and prices of the last iteration.16
The designer must solve at least three problems.   1) What are allowable bids?  2) How
do we determine which bids and offers to accept, and how do we accomplish this in a
                                                          
13 To our knowledge, at that time in 1993, there had never previously been an operating combined value
market.  One exception could be our Cassini Resource Exchange (see, Ledyard et al. (1994)) but that was a
barter system as opposed to a financial call market where quasi-linearity can be used in the selection of
allocations.
14 The mechanism does allow for  transaction fees that are remuneration to the market designers and
operators.  The ACE market imposes a 3% transaction free for each trade based on the value of the trade.
This transaction fee is automatically taken into account in the bids and offers submitted in the market.  We
needed to imbed the transaction fee into the market due to the requirement that [this was self imposed
because of clearance and settlement issues]  individuals could not sell short or trade on margin.  In order to
guarantee RTC delivery and funds transfers from trades, participants are required to escrow their credits
and funds prior to the market opening so that trades are ensured.  Since transaction fees are part of the
transfers they were incorporated into the bids so that no deficits are possible.  This is just one of many
practical issues we needed to address in the market design process
15 As both the users of the market and we became more familiar with the way the CVCM  performed,
upgrades in the types of bids allowed and the pricing rule provided desired improvements.  See, e.g.,
footnote 17.
16 In the actual market, there is a maximum of 5 and a minimum of 3iterations per auction.
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reasonable amount of time?  3) How are prices computed and what do the agents pay?
We take these up in order below.
V. A. Orders
Our combined value market allows for a variety of order types.  A multi-market order for
agent i is a vector <bi, qi1, ...., qin, Fi> where:
· bi>0 means agent i is willing to pay at most bi for the order,
· bi<0 means agent i is willing to accept at least bi for the order.
· qij>0 means agent i wants to purchase up to qij units of j in the order,
· qij<0 means agent i wants to sell up to qij units of j in the order,
· Fi is a scale factor (0 < Fi < 1) which indicates that agent i is willing to accept one
order of the form <fi ·  bi, fi ·  qi1, ...., fi ·  qin,>  where fi Î [Fi,1].  For an “all or none”
bid, F=1.
 Let’s consider some examples.  An order <1000,(0,0,10),0.6> for only one commodity
indicates that the agent is willing to purchase any size order between 100 and 60 percent
of the full order for asset 3. That is, he is willing to pay up to $1000 for 10 units of asset
3, or he is also willing to pay up to $600 for 6 units of asset 3, or any convex combination
of these orders. If Fi > 0, we say that the agent's order is inflexible, and if Fi=0 then we
say the agent is flexible. As we will see, inflexibility may come at a cost to the agent.
Orders may  also be combined as packages.   That is, an order may consist of a set of
linked orders. For example, a package order can specify a willingness to pay up to $100
for 10 units of asset 2, 20 units of asset 3 and 30 units of asset 4.  That would look like
<100, (0, 10, 20, 30),0>.  A packaged order may also consist of a swap, which consists of
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buying units of some assets and selling units of other assets. For example, a swap order
can specify a willingness to pay up to $10 to supply 10 units of asset 4 if and only if 10
units of asset 2 are received.  This would be <-10, (0,-2, 0, 10), 0>.
Orders are also allowed to be connected by logical XORs (exclusive OR’s). An XOR is a
logical element that binds one or more orders together.  For example, an agent is able to
submit an order that states a willingness to transact one and only one of “purchase 10
units of asset 3 for up to $10” or “purchase 20 units of asset 4 for up to $20”.  This is
equivalent to saying that out of a set of orders, at most one of the orders should be
accepted.
V.B. Matching
We will now use i to denote orders as opposed to agent identification to reduce the
notational burdens.  The allocation at each iteration is determined by solving the integer
program:
V* =        Maximize S i bi · fi (5)
           f
subject to
di Î {0,1}; di
 Fi
 <  fi
 <  di feasibility (6)
S i fi · qij < 0   "  j no excess demand (7)
S kÎ Mi dk < 1   "  Mi XOR constraints (8)
V* > 0 positive gains from exchange (9)
Thus, if di = 0 then order i is not filled, while if di ¹  0 then order i is filled up to the scaled
amount fi.  Due to the discrete nature of the packaged bids, there can be cases in which
there are gains from exchange, but demand is less than supply S i di · qij < 0   for some j.
In this case, the exchange is made and the untransacted RTCs are retired unused.  (There
is free disposal.)  The set Mi is the set of orders that are "ORed" with order i.
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Conceptually, the allocation problem takes submitted bids and maximizes revealed
surplus given demand and supply constraints and contingent constraints. This is a mixed-
integer linear  program (MILP) and there are many techniques to solve this type of
problem (see Skiena (1997)). With 128 different RTCs and a large number of  bids, this
may not be computable in a reasonable length of time.  For our initial market we broke
the RTCs into four smaller markets: NOx zone 1, NOx zone 2, SOx zone 1, SOx zone 2;
each one of these submarkets has 32 RTCs. In addition, there were restrictions placed on
bids that retained the packaging and contingent capabilities but also reduced the
computational burden17.
V.C. Pricing
After the allocation is computed in (5)-(9), we know which bids will be matched and
completed.  But we also need to compute what each matched bid will pay or receive.
That is we need to compute the transaction prices.   As we stated earlier, the principles
we used in designing the pricing rule were: (a) payments equal receipts among the
bidders, (b) no one pays more (receives less) than they bid (offer), (c) there are incentives
to reveal one's true willingness to pay, and (d) everyone pays the same price per unit
unless there are significant reasons for deviating.   As we will see below, deviations from
these principles will occur only in cases with important inflexibilities.
After the allocation problem is solved there will be three categories of orders:
(i) those orders that were accepted by the allocation;
(ii) those orders that were rejected by the allocation; and
                                                          
17 As the traders and we developed familiarity with the performance of the combined value call market in
the real world,  new features were requested and added.  New types of bids were allowed.   For example, a
“zone free” bid was implemented which left it to the computer to decide which permits one could  buy and
then to compute the least cost trade to fulfill my goals.  A similar setup was introduced to allow for “cycle
free” trading.  Each new type of trade required revisions to the optimization program and to the pricing
rules (primarily to eliminate arbitrage opportunities).  Another paper is being prepared which will provide
more of these details.
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(iii) those orders that were partially accepted and rejected (that is, 0< f<1, where f is
the allocated fraction in the order).  We will treat the accepted part as an accepted
order and the rejected part as a rejected order.
In addition, some of these orders will have been part of an XOR order.
A little economics will now take us a long way.  Think about the entire collection of
submitted orders as a quasi-linear economy and ask what a market equilibrium (a
competitive equilibrium) would look like.  It is easy to show that, if a competitive
equilibrium allocation and price vector p exist  then the allocation would solve the
allocation problem in (5) - (9) and the prices p (one price for each item) would solve
bi - p·  qi  > 0  for all accepted orders
bi - p· qi < 0 for all rejected bids
bik - p· qik > bik* - p· qik*  if ik is accepted and ik* is ORed with ik
p·S i Î A qi = 0                      Walras Law
(Note that bi - p·  qi = 0 for any bid which is only partially accepted.)
If such a market equilibrium price exists, it would satisfy our principles and would be the
natural price to set.  Unfortunately, neither the uniqueness nor the existence of such a
price vector p is guaranteed.
If the market equilibrium prices exist but are not unique, there are many ways to pick
one.  We use a "split-the-difference" rule.  Specifically, we
(i) Find the competitive equilibrium price that maximizes the net surplus to the
buyers (a vector of “low'' prices);
(ii) Find the competitive equilibrium price that maximizes the net surplus to the
sellers (a vector "high'' prices); and
(iii) For each commodity, we take the midpoint of (i) and (ii).
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To see how this works look at figure 5.  If all orders are fully flexible (that is, F=0) and
there are no XOR constraints, then any price from $2 to $3 would be a competitive
equilibrium price.  Our "split-the-difference" rule would select a price of $2.50/unit.
--- Figure 5 here---
Non-existence is a deeper problem requiring somewhat more finesse.18  To see what the
problem is, look again at Figure 5.   Suppose now that Buyer (B1) has an inflexible order
and is willing to pay up to $9 for 3 units and no fewer. Further suppose Seller (S1) has an
inflexible order and is willing to sell 2 units for at least $4.  Lastly, suppose Seller (S2) is
willing to sell 1 unit for at least $4. Surplus is maximized, given the flexibility
constraints, if and only if all orders are filled. This is the only feasible allocation yielding
positive surplus.  There is, however, no competitive equilibrium. To see this, observe that
at any price above $3 per unit, B1 is unwilling to buy units, and at any price below $4 per
unit, S2 is unwilling to sell any units.
To price out the allocation when a market equilibrium price does not exist, we construct a
"pseudo-competitive equilibrium price."  First, we ignore rejected orders19 and consider
only the accepted orders, i.e., orders i such that di
* ¹  0.  We then calculate a fully flexible
allocation by maximizing the surplus, subject to no excess demand, with di
*Î  [0,1].  This
is the allocation that would occur if all orders were fully flexible. Next, we find prices for
this allocation exactly as we did before; splitting the difference if the competitive
equilibrium price is not unique.  (In this case it is easy to show an equilibrium price will
exist.)   In Figure 5, this means that the price is $2.50; the price that would obtain if all
orders were fully flexible (F=0).
                                                          
18 When Cantor-Fitzgerald created a version of a combined value market in response to ACE (see Marron
and Bartels), they recognized this problem.  But they solved it by constraining the original match to only
consider a set of bids for which a competitive price would exist.  This of course reduces the possible trades
that will be matched and in some cases, such as those in Figures 5-7 below, will lead to no trade - even
though there are obvious gains from exchange.  We did not want to lose those trades.
19 This means that at the pseudo price it is possible that bi - p· qi  > 0 for rejected orders.
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But we are still not quite finished.  If we were to charge and pay every bid according to
the price of $2.50, Seller 2 would be receiving less than the minimum her bid indicated
she was willing to accept per unit ($4.00).  Further, even though Buyer 1 created the non-
existence problem by requiring his bid be all-or-none, he would receive a surplus of
$0.50 on the extra unit sold that way.  To provide the right incentives, to minimize all-or-
none bids, and to not over-charge or under-pay, we charge or pay each part of an
originally accepted bid that was rejected in the fully flexible allocation exactly what they
bid.  So in Figure 5, Seller 2 will receive $4 for her unit and Buyer 1 will pay $3 for the
last unit.
But if we do this we still have a problem.  If Seller 1 receives $2.50/unit sold and buyer 1
pays $2.50/unit for the first two units bought we will have to pay out more than we
receive.  In fact, the area indicated as negative surplus in Figure 6 is exactly the amount
we will be short.  Let Vf denote the surplus from the fully flexible allocation, V* denote
the surplus from the original matching procedure, and let dV = Vf - V*, the added surplus
from flexibility.  dV is exactly the negative surplus in Figure 6.  We need to collect this
amount from those bids accepted in the fully flexible allocation.  There are many ways to
carry out this accommodation of the inflexible bidders.  In the pollution market design,
we chose to split price prices and charge buyers a different (and higher) price than we
paid sellers.  In particular, we took the price from the flexible allocation and added and
subtracted an amount D p.  Buyers will pay p + D p and sellers will receive p - D p . D p is
chosen so that (2 D p)*q = dV, where q is the volume traded in the fully flexible
allocation.  For the example in Figure 5 and 6, D p =  $0.25.  So, in that example, Seller 1
receives $2.25/unit sold for a gain over her stated willingness to accept of $0.50.  Seller 2
receives $4.00/unit for a gain of $0.00 and Buyer 1 pays $2.75/unit for two units and
$3.00 for one unit for a gain of $0.50.  The total surplus from the trade is $1.00 and that is
split between the three traders.
You may have noticed that if Buyer 2 were really two people - say, Buyer 2' and Buyer
2", where Buyer 2' wanted one unit for $3.50 and Buyer 2" wanted one unit for $2.40, we
could not implement the pricing scheme as it is so far.  The fully flexible price would be
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$2.20 and when we went to split prices we could not pick a D p that would leave Buyer 2"
paying less than or equal to what the willingness to pay is.  In this case we stop at a D p
that puts him at zero surplus (here that is $0.20).  Remove him from the computation and
continue to split prices for the others until we just balance payments and receipts.
A somewhat more complicated example illustrating this is given in Figure 7.  In this
Figure, B1 is willing to pay $9 for 1 unit and B2 is willing to pay $9 for 3 units. S1 is
willing to sell 2 units for $4 and S2 is willing to sell 2 units for $8.20. All orders are
inflexible. In this case the full allocation gives a surplus of $5.80.
---Figure 7 here --
At the fully flexible allocation, q=2 and the price is $2.50.  Since B2 and S2 are extra-
marginal, S2 receives his ask price of $4.10 for each of his 2 units and B2 receives his bid
price of $3 for each of his 2 extra-marginal units. This leaves a deficit of $2.20 that must
be made up by the difference between the price B1 pays for his unit, the price B2 pays for
his infra-marginal unit,  and the price S1 receives for his units.  Splitting prices leads us
to hit the willingness to pay of Buyer 2 and the willingness to accept of Seller 1.  So we
end up with Seller 1 receiving exactly what she bid, Buyer 2 paying exactly what he bid.
We then continue to raise the buy price until receipts balance against payments.  This
leaves Buyer 1 paying $3.20.
The above may seem a convoluted way to match and price combined value trades.  It is
made particularly difficult when one allows all-or-none trades.  But the proof is in the
performance.  We tested that in the economics lab and now turn to those results.
VI. Experimental Results
In this section we describe the results of experiments with this new market
design—the combined value call market (CVCM).  As with the UPDA experiments,
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subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student population at the California
Institute of Technology. All the subjects had experience in other market experiments and
participated in a 90-minute train session the day prior to the experiments to become
familiar with the auction rules and software (they were paid a flat $20 fee for the training
session).   Each experimental session consisted of a single market instance. Each session
was run on a computer network and lasted approximately 1.5 hours. Experimental
sessions consisted of 3 commodities that were traded simultaneously. Subjects were
assigned randomly to a set of redemption values, costs and endowments. All subjects
were paid in cash at the end of the experimental sessions.
VI.A. Returns-to-scale
The results for the returns-to-scale environments are given in  Figure 8.  The
superadditive values are the same as those found in Appendix A.  The same as were used
with UPDA.  The Figure shows the prices, volumes and efficiency for each market.
Coincidentally, the combined value markets lasted 7 iterations, exactly the same as with
UPDA.  However, unlike UPDA, the CVCM produced 100% allocations in all sessions
and markets.  CVCM starts off at relatively high efficiencies and reaches over 90%
efficiency by iteration 4.  Thus, we find:
CVCM outperforms UPDA in the returns-to-scale environments.  CVCM produces 100%
efficient allocations.
--- Figure 8  here ---
VI.B. Strong Complements
Two sessions, with the same strong complements environment we used to test UPDA,
were run to test  the CVCM.  The results from these sessions can be found in Figure 9.
Session 1 lasted 7 iterations before the market closed and session 2 lasted 5 iterations.
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The results were very similar with outcomes of 90% and 100% efficiencies.  Again we
find:
CVCM outperforms UPDA in the environments with complements CVCM produces near
100% efficient allocations.
---Figure 9 here ---
IV.C. All or None
In Figure 1 we illustrated an environment with “all or none” payoffs in which UPDA
simply could not perform.  To see how this type of market is handled by  the CVCM, we
conducted two sessions with the parameters defined in Figure 10.  The main difference
between this environment and the one charted in Figure 1 is that there is more surplus in
the market. Also, costs and values are scaled down.  The results of these experiments can
be found in Figure 11.  If any trade takes place it must be at 100% efficiency.  In UPDA,
no trade ever occurred.  In CVCM, during the first few iterations, no trade occurs also.
But unlike UPDA, CVCM finally facilitated trades even in this very difficult situation.
The prices for the buyer and sellers are charted in the figure for both sessions.  The
mechanism found a set of prices that split the surplus between seller 1 and the buyer with
seller 2 receiving his offer price.
---Figure 10 here---
---Figure 11  here---
VII. Conclusions
RECLAIM was created as an emissions trading program.  In an attempt to retain
regulatory control over the temporal and spatial distribution of pollutants, the program
established 128 different market commodities.  A complex collection of psuedo-property
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rights exists that makes identifying and completing trades very difficult.  The derived
value of the permits, what facilities are willing to pay or accept to trade them, has a
structure that makes it difficult for even single commodity markets to work effectively.
All-or-none trades are desirable, and  returns to scale abound. Strong complementarities
between commodities create further difficulties.  Adding to these problems for traditional
markets, the program is thin with a small number of participants and there is no history of
market trades to provide information for price discovery.
To design a market for RECLAIM, we first studied the performance of a "traditional" call
market in these situations.  A Uniform Price Double Auction was test-bedded.  It did not
perform well .  It never did match buyers and sellers in all-or-none situations.  It
produced only 55-66% of the potential gains from exchange in situations with strong
complements.  UPDA simply cannot handle non-convexities.
We designed and created a combined value call market we believed would be able to
handle non-convexities.  The market was designed to allow buyers and sellers to tailor
their orders so entire portfolios of credits can be traded.  The main incentive feature of
the market is a pricing rule that calculates prices from marginal traders so inframarginal
traders have an incentive to reveal values and costs.  The combined value nature of the
allocation process allows the inframarginal portfolio traders to fully reveal without the
danger of financial exposure.
We testbedded the Combined Value Market in the same environments that we tested the
Uniform Price Auction.  It significantly out-performed UPDA.  In fact it matched buyers
and sellers for 100% or nearly 100% of the potential gains from trade in all situations in
which is was used.
The experiments conducted in this paper show that this market design allocates units at
near 100% efficiency, which a Uniform Price Auction run separately for each permit type
can not come close to producing.
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Appendix A
Environment Values
Superadditive Values*
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Endowment
Market A
0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5
Value Unit1 20 20 20 20 20 15 15 15
Unit 2 35 30 30 25 20 12 12 12
Unit 3 45 40 35 30 25 11 11 11
Unit 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Endowment
Market B
0 0 0 0 3 3 2 2
Value Unit 1 27 13 7 5 25 25 25 27
Unit 2 28 15 10 9 21 19 13 15
Unit 3 29 17 13 13 18 17 10 10
Unit 4 30 19 16 17 7 7 7 7
Unit 5 31 21 19 21 5 5 5 5
Unit 6 32 23 21 25 0 0 0 0
Unit 7 33 25 24 29 0 0 0 0
Unit 8 34 27 27 33 0 0 0 0
Unit 9 35 29 30 37 0 0 0 0
Unit 10 36 31 33 40 0 0 0 0
Endowment
Market C
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Value Unit 1 50 50 50 30 30 35 35 35
Unit 2 58 58 58 55 55 60 60 606
Unit 3 60 60 60 60 60 65 65 65
* Values are in experimental currency -- francs; 1 franc = $.50
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Strong Complements Values*
Bidder ID Amount
of A
Amount
of B
Value Bidder ID Amount
of A
Amount
of B
Value
1 4 3 100 2 3 6 125
1 7 3 175 2 3 10 150
1 12 3 250 2 3 14 175
1 4 9 150 2 9 6 175
1 7 9 225 2 9 10 190
1 12 9 325 2 9 14 200
1 4 13 175 2 15 6 200
1 7 13 250 2 15 10 225
1 12 13 335 2 15 14 250
3 3 2 75 4 6 8 100
3 3 4 100 4 6 10 150
3 3 9 125 4 6 12 200
3 5 2 100 4 8 8 150
3 5 4 200 4 8 10 200
3 5 9 225 4 8 12 275
3 12 2 175 4 12 8 175
3 12 4 250 4 12 10 250
3 12 9 275 4 12 12 300
5 6 7 175 6 7 7 75
5 6 10 225 6 7 9 150
5 6 13 250 6 7 11 175
5 9 7 225 6 9 7 125
5 9 10 275 6 9 9 175
5 9 13 300 6 9 11 2000
5 12 7 250 6 11 7 150
5 12 10 300 6 11 9 200
5 12 13 325 6 11 11 225
* Values are in experimental currency -- francs; 1 franc = $.10
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Appendix B
Instructions for TSC
You are about to participate in an economic experiment in which you will earn money
based on the decisions you make.  All earnings you make in the experiment are yours to
keep.  Here are some important features of our experiment:
· All accounting (values, prices and costs) will be stated in francs.  Each franc you earn
can be converted into US currency at the rate specified on your Opportunities Sheet
(see below).
· We will be conducting a Market in which you can buy and/or sell the items found on
your Opportunities Sheet.
· The Market will consist of Rounds in which you will make decisions.  You only earn
francs when the Market closes, not for each Round of the Market.
· When the Market closes you will fill out your Accounting Sheet and a monitor will
verify your earnings and accounting.
The Opportunities Sheet
Your Opportunities Sheet is private information; you should not reveal it to anyone.  This
sheet lists items (A, B, C) that you can buy or sell.  Below you will find a sample sheet
for participant 10 who has a franc conversion rate of ___ francs to a dollar.  In addition,
this participant must pay ___ francs to use the sheet.  This participant has an inventory of
___ units of item A, ___ units of B, and ___ units of C.  Each participant is free to sell up
to, but not beyond, the number of units they have in their inventory.  Under each item
there is a value listed in francs for the number of units ;you finally hold when the market
closes.  The last column in the table lists the additional value of getting the particular
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package combination of the items.  For example, if the participant were to get 1 unit of B
she would receive ___ francs; if she were to get two units of B she would get an
additional ___ francs or a total of ___ francs.  If the participant obtained ___ units of A
and ___ units of C she would get __________ francs in value.
Earnings for a period are equal to the sum of the values obtained plus revenue from units
sold in the market minus the cost of the units bought in the market.  For example, if at the
end of the period the participant sold 3 units of C at ___ francs each; and bought 2 units
of B at a price of ___ her earnings for the period would be:
OPPORTUNITIES SHEET
Period _____
Participant _____   Conversion Rate _____  francs = _____  Dollars
Cost          __________
A Market B Market C Market Package
Units Value Units Value Units Value Value
INITIAL INVENTORY
A  =  _______________     B = _______________     C = _______________
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Accounting Sheet
When the market closes you must fill out an accounting statement for the period.
Attached to these instructions you will find an accounting sheet.  Just fill in the lines of
the form and make the proper additions and subtractions.
How the Market Trading Systems Works
Submitting an Order
The market is divided into rounds in which you can submit orders to the market.  An
order is a listing of the items A, B and C along with a franc amount.  A minus entry
means that you want to sell the specified number of units and a positive entry means you
want to buy the specified number of units.  In the franc position a negative amount (let us
call it your sell offer) implies you want to receive the specified amount or more; a
positive sign (let us call this your buy offer) implies you are willing to pay that amount
or less.  Below you will find an example.  There are four upper boxes in the ORDER
FORM which lists each of the items A, B and C along with a box for francs.  Next to
each item in parentheses, is the amount of units you are allowed to sell in the market and
the amount of francs you have in your credit line.  In the example order form below, the
order is to sell 10 units of A and buy 2 units of B and 4 units of C.  The entire package is
offered with a buy offer of 6 francs or less.
A (15)    B (7)          C (5)       francs (9000)
     Scale [0,1]
ORDER FORM
-10 2 4 6
options save OPEN
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There are several features of the above order that are important:
· The order is for a package of items.  It is an all or nothing order in that the entire
amounts
–10A, 4B and 2C must be filled if the order is to be a valid transaction.
· The franc amount is a total package price offered, not a per unit price for a specific
item.
· A buy offer is an upper bound on what you are willing to pay.  A sell offer is a lower
bound on the amount of francs you are willing to receive for the order.
Tailoring Your Order
Your order can be customized in three ways that may assist you in obtaining a desired
transaction.
Scaleable Orders  Recall that the order placed in the above example was all or nothing.
You can request that the order be less restrictive.  You do this by submitting a scale
number between 0 and 1 that you would be willing to scale your order to get it accepted.
The best way to explain this feature is by an example.  In the order form below a scale of
.5 is submitted with the order.  This means that you want to sell at least 5 units of A and
buy at least 1 unit of B and 2 units of C for a package price of 3 francs.  That is, all units
are scaled by one-half.  The scale also means that you are willing to scale up your order
from this minimum in all dimensions up to the full order.
A (15)    B (7)          C (5)       francs (9000)
     Scale [0,1]
ORDER FORM
-10 2 4 6
options save OPEN .5
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Contingent Orders  If you submit more than one order you can tie your orders together.
When two orders are tied together they become linked so that if one of them is accepted
the other will not be accepted.  In the example below, the bidder has two orders (Ids 4
and 5) that he has already constructed and wants his current order of –10A, 2B, 4C at a
buy offer of 6 to be contingent with orders 4 and 5.  He does this by tying them together
with the same Con Id.  This means that at most one of the orders with the same Con Id
will be filled.
Open Orders  Unless you specify otherwise, the orders you submit in a round will be
closed, i.e., no other participant can view what you send to the market during the round.
If you would like others to see what you send to the market before the round finishes you
can send the order to the open book.  Orders in the open book can be viewed by all
participants and will be part of the orders submitted to the market for the round.
A (15)    B (7)          C (5)       francs (9000)
     Scale [0,1]
ORDER FORM
-10 2 4 6
options save OPEN
contingent
Pick Con ID francs A B C
Ö 1 4 -20 -2 -3 2
Ö 1 5 30 3 5 1
contingent
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Order Restrictions
The following three constraints will be placed on your orders:
· Your order can be submitted to the market if it does not violate your credit line and
you try to sell more units than you have in your account.  The constraint on your
orders is cumulative.  That is, each time an order is submitted your account is reduced
by the amounts in that order.  Sells count against the item account and buy offers are
subtracted from your franc account.  For contingent orders, we will use the maximum
amount of each sell item and buy offer among the tied orders to debt your account.
However, sell orders do not increase your franc account and buy orders do not
increase your unit accounts.
· One other important restriction on the accepted orders in a round is that all
transactions will be in whole numbers, i.e., units are transacted in increments of size
1.  Thus, all bid amounts must be in integer amounts and all transactions will be made
in integer amounts.
· Only previous round “accepted” orders and open book orders can be changed (they
must have a higher buy price or lower sell price).  This will be discussed in more
detail later.
ROUND Results
Orders submitted in a round will be placed into a program that finds which orders are
standing for the round using the following rules:
1. The accepted orders do not violate the order parameters.
2. The total amount sold is greater than or equal to the total amount purchased.
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3. The difference between the buy offers and the sell offers from the accepted orders
that obey 1 and 2 is as large, net of transaction fees, as we can find.  We will call this
amount the market surplus.
The set of accepted orders from the above rules become the Standing Orders for the
market.  Standing orders in a round are automatically submitted to the next round.
Participants holding standing orders or open book orders may increase the offer price on
the order, and may include the order in a contingent order.  Participants can also submit
new orders each round.
Market buy prices and market sell prices will be calculated each period.  The market
price of an order is then (buy prices * amounts bought) – (sell prices * amounts sold).
Prices will be chosen, if possible, so that
1. The market buy and market sell prices are the same.
2. The market price of each accepted (rejected) order, is less than (greater than) or equal
to its offer amount.
The amount you will pay (receive if the market price is negative) for an accepted order if
the market were to close in that round is:
Your Payment=(market buy prices*amounts you buy)–(market sell prices*amounts you
sell)
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Round Result Information
When the round ends, we will display aggregate results of the round.  Specifically, we
will provide participants with the following informational display
Round Current Surplus Change
in Surplus
Total Volume Change in Total
Volume
3 100 20 10 5
A B C
market buy price 2 1 2
market sell price 1.5 .5 1.75
units traded 3 3 4
units available 10 10 10
sell units offered 5 5 10
buy units offered 10 10 10
You will also see the orders that you had accepted along with your prices.  After the
round starts you will be able to see the open book orders.
STOPPING the Period
The auction period will end after round 2 if surplus or volume does not increase by 5%
over previous round surplus or volume.
FIGURES
Figure 1: An all or nothing trading example where there is no uniform price equilibrium.
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2Figure 2:  Superadditive valued markets.  Markets A and B have a uniform price
competitive equilibrium price.  Market C has a nonlinear competitive price equilibrium
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3Figure 3: Supperadditive results using UPDA
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4Figure 4: strong complements results using UPDA
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5Figure 5:  Non-Existence of Equilibrium for All or Nothing Trades
Figure 6:  Price Calculation with All or Nothing Orders
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6Figure 7:  Price Calculation
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7Figure 8: Superadditive results using CVCM
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8Figure 9: Strong complement results using CVCM
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9Figure 10:  Block Trade Environment
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Figure 11:  Block Trade Results using CVCM
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